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The role of the Judenräte [Jewish 
councils] in the German-occupied 
lands of World War II remains one 
of the most difficult, that is, sensitive, 
complicated and controversial, issues 
in the historiography of the Holocaust. 
The responses and the decisions taken 
by the members of these councils have 
been morally examined and historically 
investigated in an enormous literature. 
Doron Rabinovici’s book describes 
in detail the Viennese “model” and 
discusses in depth the challenges faced 
by the functionaries and employees of 
the Jewish community authorities in 
Vienna during the war.
Public discussion among the Jews 
on the responsibility of the “Jewish 
leaders” began immediately after the 
end of the war. In some cases survivors 
or whole communities initiated legal 
proceedings against some of them. On 
the other hand, since the 1960s historical 
debate has been dominated by the 
critiques of the historian Raul Hilberg 
and the philosopher Hannah Arendt.1 
Hilberg saw in the Judenräte a form of 
leadership that was a continuation of 
1 R. Hilberg, The Destruction of European 
Jews, Chicago 1961; H. Arendt, Eichmann in 
Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, 
New York 1963.
the traditional leadership that existed 
before the war; thus the community 
leaders were trapped and without 
realizing it were turned into a “tool” of 
the German machinery of destruction, 
because they faced the new situation 
with a frame of mind that had been 
shaped by the experience of 2000 years 
of persecution. Arendt’s radical view, 
which became famous with her report 
on Adolf Eichmann’s trial, was a severe 
critique of the Jewish “leadership”; she 
accused the Jewish functionaries, almost 
without exception, of cooperating in 
one way or another, for one reason or 
another, with the Nazis in a way almost 
equivalent to treason. Both Hilberg and 
Arendt faulted in considering Judenräte 
as the “Jewish leadership”, because, as 
Dan Michman has convincingly argued, 
since the eve of the Nazi period one can 
speak only of many Jewish leaderships, 
of many different cases, of many Jewish 
religious, social and political groups.2 
Doron Rabinovici, positioning himself 
in this debate, goes one step further 
2 Dan Michman, “Jewish Leadership 
in Extremis”, in The Historiography of the 
Holocaust, ed. D. Stone, London 2004, pp. 319-
340; cf. also Y. Gutman and C. J. Haft (eds), 
Patterns of Jewish Leadership in Nazi Europe, 
1933-1945, Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1979.
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in spite of persecution.3
Rabinovici initially situates the 
Kultusgemeinde in the context of pre-
war Vienna. The National Socialist 
policy towards the Jews in Vienna was 
not imported from without. Either 
because of anti-Semitic indulgence or 
because of tacit concern, the victims 
were deprived of any support. Viennese 
Jews lived in an ambience of exclusion 
from professions or economy and of 
unrestrained violence against them. 
During the Austriofascist period, the 
Jewish community of Vienna had to 
cooperate already with an authoritarian 
state as a means of protecting its 
interests. Long before the Anschluss, 
Austria had ceased to be a democratic 
society. When the Nazis came to power, 
they discovered a Jewish institution that 
was already well practised in submitting 
to state authority in order to survive. 
Historicizing the conditions under 
which Jews and their authorities had 
to live brings up the issue of the birth 
of the Nazi idea of establishing a 
3 P. Friedman, Roads to Extinction: Essays 
on the Holocaust, Philadelphia 1980; I. Trunk, 
Judenrat: The Jewish Councils in Eastern 
Europe under Nazi Occupation, New York 
1972; A. Weiss, “Judenrat”, Encyclopedia of the 
Holocaust, ed. I. Gutman, New York 1990. In 
this same line of research we should mention 
an important study on Rabbi Zvi Koretz and 
the Judenrat of Thessaloniki. Minna Rozen 
challenges received wisdom that asserts 
Koretz’s “collaboration” by reconsidering the 
testimonies and by contextualizing his role in 
the framework of the community’s tensions; 
cf. M. Rozen, “Jews and Greeks Remember 
their Past: The Political Career of Tzevi 
Koretz (1933-1943)”, Jewish Social Studies 2, 
1 (2005), pp. 111-166. 
than Michman and makes his claim 
quite clear in his study: Vienna’s 
Jewish authorities, the Israelitische 
Kultusgemeinde, should not be seen as 
an “autonomous leadership” but as an 
“authority without power” (p. 161) at the 
mercy of the perpetrators. The members 
of the Kultusgemeinde were victims 
forced by a totalitarian regime to sacrifice 
themselves by being incorporated in the 
machinery of destruction. Rabinovici’s 
position is crucial both morally and 
epistemologically, because, by adopting 
it, he avoids criticism from a historically 
secured position which, among other 
things, risks confusing victims and their 
persecutors. His investigation starts from 
a shocking observation: the constant 
fear of death and the will to survive 
were frequently ignored in the after-
war judgment of Jewish SS accomplices. 
Their social responsibility, Rabinovici 
reminds us, could well have been at the 
root of their decision to collaborate (a 
hope of being able to negotiate with the 
SS and to rescue Jews). As a result, victims 
were sentenced more severely after 1945 
than their tormentors, thus remaining 
victims. Under the Nazis the victims were 
forbidden to live. After the liberation 
they had to justify their survival (p. 10). 
In this sense, Rabinovici’s study could 
be inscribed in the historiographical 
tradition of Philip Friedman, Isaiah 
Trunk or Aaron Weiss, all historians who 
have taken into consideration the internal 
community conflicts coupled with the 
pressure from the Germans, the many 
tasks and duties of the functionaries, and 
the balancing act they had to perform 
between carrying out German orders, 
meeting Jewish needs, and trying to 
preserve the existence of the community 
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Eichmann found himself in an 
opportune moment of his career; far 
from being a “banal official”, notes 
Rabinovici, he had enjoyed executive 
power. The Nazis had a calculated plan, 
the systematic expulsion of the Jews, and 
Eichmann worked for it by setting up the 
Central Office for Jewish Emigration. 
In some 18 months he would succeed 
in displacing, by forced emigration 
and other means, about 150,000 Jews. 
Löwenherz, as an administrative director, 
would ensure institutional continuity. 
The Jewish administration would 
expedite persecution and communicate 
the countless discriminating laws to 
the Jews. Jewish life was controlled 
by a single administration, in turn 
controlled by the Gestapo. Löwenherz 
himself worked under Nazi control, 
almost totally depending on Eichmann. 
The powerlessness of the institution 
was frequently seen as unwillingness to 
help and indifference. Another tragic 
figure, Benjamin Murmelstein, was a 
rabbi, a scholar turned administrator, 
an intellectual turned bureaucrat and 
a man of God who became a manager 
of misery (p. 73). He risked his life to 
organize emigration, and his work saved 
the lives of many people between 1938 
and 1940. However, his demeanour 
and his imperiousness brought him 
into discredit. It is evident that the line 
between community welfare work and 
collaboration was becoming very thin.
Zionists had been organizing illegal 
emigration to Palestine since 1934, and, 
now that the possibilities had dwindled, 
they were willing to pay money to get 
away. Eichmann saw this as a way of 
financing the expulsion of hundreds 
Jewish “leadership” and sheds light on 
the fact that this was not an inherent 
imperative of anti-Jewish policies. 
Judenräte emerged only under certain 
circumstances. We should remember 
that, although the establishment of 
Judenräte followed the expansion of 
Nazi Germany, Italy, Croatia, Denmark, 
and some regions of Poland and of the 
USSR never saw the emergence of these 
bodies. Already in 1937 the circles of 
the Jewish Department of the Security 
Service of the SS (of which Eichmann 
was an employee) came up with the idea 
of Judenräte as a means to hasten Jewish 
emigration. It was only in September 
1939, during the first weeks of the 
occupation of Poland, that Reinhard 
Heydrich gave in a Schnellbrief the order 
for the formation of Judenräte. Before 
that and after the annexation of Austria 
(March 1938), Eichmann had been sent 
to Vienna to reorganize the Jewish 
community. At that time, 165,000-
180,000 Jews were living in Vienna and 
15,000 in the rest of Austria. Joseph 
Löwenherz, a lawyer by profession, was 
appointed as “Director”, at the head of the 
decapitated, “reorganized” community. 
The Vienna Kultusgemeinde was to 
become the prototype for a Jewish 
administration under Nazi control and 
a precursor of the later Judenräte. The 
Jewish community made every effort 
to reinstate the Jewish community 
authorities, even if they were under the 
control of the Nazis, as the only means 
of organizing self help, welfare and 
flight abroad, specifically emigration 
to Palestine or to other countries. 
However, the community was at the 
mercy of the persecutors.
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themselves. The Kultusgemeinde was 
responsible to notify those selected for 
deportation. The Jewish functionaries 
had very little room for manoeuvre, but 
they thought they could avoid additional 
hardship. As emigration was still possible, 
they complied with the order of the Nazi 
authorities so as to prevent worse. In 1941 
more than 6000 Jews were able to escape 
from the Third Reich in this way. The 
Jewish administration could ask for people 
to be removed from the lists and members 
of the community could be removed as 
being irreplaceable in Vienna. This was 
in fact a German method to make easier 
the blackmailing of the community into 
cooperating. Rabinovici pronounces a 
balanced statement: although the Central 
Office would no doubt have killed all of 
the Viennese Jews without the Jewish 
administration, the deportation and 
extermination would not have gone 
smoothly without its collaboration (p. 119).
The escalation of events is tragically 
well known: by May 1941, 10,000 Viennese 
Jews departed for the General Government. 
In summer 1942 their destinations were 
Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka. In June 
1942 the last great wave of deportation 
was directed to Theresienstadt. By 
September 1942 the mass deportation of 
the Jews of Vienna had been completed. 
The vast majority of the administration 
employees, around 1100 people along 
with their families, were deported in the 
last two transports of 1-2 October 1942. In 
November 1942 the Kultusgemeinde was 
dissolved and replaced by a Council of 
Elders of the Jews of Vienna. From March 
1943 to October 1944 smaller transports 
were led to Auschwitz. 600 Jews remained 
hidden in Vienna. 
more Jews. The Zionist organizations 
were forced to cooperate with the 
Nazis in order to rescue the victims of 
persecution (p. 56). They were powerless, 
trapped between the Nazi persecution, 
the cynical imperial policy of the UK 
and the indifference of neutral countries. 
Rabinovici rightly insists: certainly never 
was there any question of negotiation 
between equal partners.
The generalized pogrom of November 
1938 marked a turning point towards 
mass murder. The pogrom was not 
local; the Nazis no longer cared what 
the international community thought, 
and Eichmann threatened with other 
pogroms. From December 1938 to the 
end of July 1939, about 104,000 Jews had 
emigrated and among them 41,500 with 
the assistance of the Kultusgemeinde. 
After this unprecedented exodus, 72,000 
Jews still remained in Vienna. When the 
war started, the international community 
closed the border and only a few countries 
remained open. In October 1939 some 
3000 Jews were deported to Nisko, an 
“autonomous Jewish settlement” in the 
area of Lublin for forced labour. The 
community was now trying to help the 
concentration camps’ inmates, while still 
encouraging aliyah – emigration to the 
Land of Israel – and emigration elsewhere 
to others. 
On 3 July 1940 Eichmann told the 
Judenrat that a “total solution” would 
have to be found. “Resettlement” (i.e. 
deportation) had to be prepared: a 
precise list of assets, property rights and 
entitlements was to be delivered to the 
collection point. The selection of the 
deportees and the drawing up of lists were 
carried out in 1941 by the Nazi authorities 
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Doron Rabinovici never loses from 
his sight a crucial issue: how were the 
deportations viewed and thought of 
by the Jews themselves? At the time it 
appeared inconceivable that cooperation 
would foster the organization of mass 
murder. It was unbelievable that the 
Nazis were interested not in exploiting 
the Jews but in exterminating them (p. 
75). Moreover, given the isolation of 
Viennese Jews, rumours of systematic 
extermination appear to have reached 
them only at the end of 1942. 
As to the responsibility of the members 
of the Kultusgemeinde, it becomes 
evident that whether people understood 
the situation clearly and without 
embellishment depended not on their 
position but their character (p. 153). In one 
way or another, the Jewish community had 
been trapped, and the question remains 
unanswered: what kind of behaviour by 
the victims during the Nazi extermination 
can be regarded as normal, when no 
alternative for action emerged?
Doron Rabinovici’s study is a rich, 
well-researched and documented book 
on a complex moral, political and 
historiographical issue. It contributes 
to our understanding of the terrible 
dilemmas faced by people who had to 
respond to an extreme, unprecedented 
situation that allowed them a very narrow 
field for action. Despite the enormous 
literature, no comprehensive comparative 
study of Judenräte in Europe has been 
carried out. Rabinovici’s book makes the 
call for such research more urgent.
Henriette-Rika Benveniste
University of Thessaly
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